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Protecting Privacy Under the Fourth
Amendment
The Fourth Amendment' has explicitly been held to protect personal
privacy2 since at least the mid-nineteenth century.3 Experts in many fields,
including law, psychology, philosophy and sociology, believe that privacy
is vitally important to all human beings,' and the Supreme Court has
1. The Fourth Amendment provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the states must comply with the provisions of the Fourth
Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
2. As a constitutional concept, privacy is an elusive yet fundamental value. Although the word
"privacy" does not appear in the Constitution, the Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional
right to privacy based upon provisions of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments and
their respective "penumbras." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965); cf Beaney, The
ConstitutionalRight to Privacy in the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 212, 215 ("The nearest
thing to an explicit recognition of a right to privacy in the Constitution is contained in the Fourth
Amendment".) This right to privacy is a "fundamental personal right, emanting 'from the totality of
the constitutional scheme.' " Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 494 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting)); see notes 4-5
infra. While recognizing that privacy is constitutionally significant in many areas of law, see, e.g.,
Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974) (libel); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
416 U.S. 470 (1974) (trade secrets); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (search and seizure), the Court has not offered any specific or comprehensive constitutional definition of privacy. See note 79 infra (discussing Supreme Court's attempts to
define privacy). See generally Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court,
1979 SUP. CT. REV. 173.
Some states have amended their constitutions in recent years to recognize expressly the right to
privacy. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 ("The right of the people to privacy is recognized and
shall not be infringed."); CAL. CONST. art. I, § I ("inalienable rights" include "pursuing and obtaining . . . privacy"); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10 ("The right of individual privacy is essential to
the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state
interest.") Such state provisions, however, also fail to provide a specific definition of privacy.
3. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (Fourth Amendment protects "the
privacies of life"); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (Fourth Amendment protects "secrecy
of letters and . . . packages"); T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 304 (1st ed. Boston 1868)
(requirements of Fourth Amendment's warrant clause must be met before "privacy . . . is allowed to
be invaded").
4. Privacy is said to be vital to the mental, spiritual, and physical well-being of all individuals.
See I. ALTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: PRIVACY, PERSONAL SPACE, TERRITORY
AND CROWDING 50 (1975) (privacy "vital to self-definition"); A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 39
(1967) (privacy "basically an instrument for achieving individual goals of self-realization"); Fried,
Privacy,77 YALE L.J. 475, 478 (1968) (privacy vital to "morality"); Gavison, Privacy and the Limits
of the Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 447 (1980) (privacy "essential" for "learning, writing, and all forms of
creativity," as well as for physical relaxation); Jourard, Some Psychological Aspects of Privacy, 31
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 307, 310 (1966) (privacy enables individuals to cope with public pressures
and maintain "physical health and . . . psychological and spiritual well-being"). Privacy is also essential for the successful pursuit and maintenance of interpersonal relationships. See Benn, Privacy,
Freedom, and Respect for Persons, in NOMOS XIII 1, 17 (J.R. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1971)
(personal relations "could not exist" without privacy); Fried, supra, at 477 (relationships of love,
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often noted that the right to privacy is fundamental.' In recent years, protection of privacy has come to be viewed as "the principal object of the
Fourth Amendment." 6 Since its 1967 decision in Katz v. United States,7
the Supreme Court has maintained that an individual is protected by the
Fourth Amendment whenever he or she has a "reasonable expectation of
privacy."' Yet today the Court and scholars alike acknowledge that the
constitutional law of search and seizure as it operates to protect privacy is
in disarray.9 Some lower courts, extrapolating from undeveloped intimations from the Supreme Court, have suggested the existence of a new,
undefined exception to the usual Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, one that refuses full Fourth Amendment protection to privacy interests perceived as lesser, trivial, or unimportant.' 0 Use of this "lesser expectation of privacy" analysis has led to disparate and conflicting judicial
decisions" and subtle manipulation of privacy protection under the Fourth
Amendment.
This Note contends that reliance on a concept of reasonable expectations to define the scope of the Fourth Amendment's privacy protection
confuses analysis and should be abandoned. Furthermore, the Note argues
that a warrant requirement exception based on the perceived "lesser" status of certain privacy interests represents a significant departure from
traditional Fourth Amendment principles, and is unworkable and unjustifriendship and trust "inconceivable" without privacy); Gavison, supra at 450 (privacy "crucial" to
human relationships). Finally, privacy has been identified as a necessary element of any free and
tolerant democratic state. See E. SHILS, THE TORMENT OF SECRECY 22-24 (1956) (privacy vital to
"liberal democracy"); Simmel, Privacy is Not an Isolated Freedom, in NOMOS XIII, supra, at 79, 8687 (privacy necessary for "freedom" and "open society"). See generally A. WESTIN, supra note 42, at
23-51 ("Privacy in the Modern Democratic State").
5. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 487 (1974) (privacy is "[a] most
fundamental human right"); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (same); Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (same); cf Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2(a), 88 Stat. 1896, 1896
(currently codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1976)) ("Congress finds that . . . the right to privacy is a
personal and fundamental right protected by the Constitution of the United States".)
6. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967); accord Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27
(1949) ("The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police. . . is at the core of
the Fourth Amendment . . ."
7. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
8. See pp. 315-16 infra (discussing reasonable expectation of privacy test).
9. See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 101 S.Ct. 2841, 2848 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring) ("[Tihe
law of search and seizure . . .is intolerably confusing. The Court apparently cannot agree even on
what it has held previously, let alone on how [the instant] cases should be decided."); Williamson,
Fourth Amendment Standing and Expectations of Privacy: Rakas v. Illinois and New Directionsfor
Some Old Concepts, 31 U. FLA. L. REV. 831, 837 (1979) (Supreme Court "has neglected to delineate
a workable substantive definition of the scope of fourth amendment protections"); Survey, The Fourth
Amendment and the Sixth Circuit: A Survey of Search and Seizure Decisions, 12 TOL. L. REV. 511,
547 (1981) (current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is "ad hoc and inconsistent body of case law
distinguished only by its essential lawlessness").
10. See pp. 322-26 infra (discussing development of lesser expectation of privacy exception).
11. See notes 104-105 infra (listing cases in which lower courts have reached opposite conclusions
when applying lesser expectation of privacy analysis to container searches).
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Privacy
fiable. After suggesting "secrecy and solitude" as the starting point for an
inclusive yet objective and sociologically accurate definition of privacy, the
Note proposes that any government action that violates an individual's
privacy interests should be subjected to full Fourth Amendment protection
based on well-developed principles of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Applying the suggested analysis to container searches, the Note demonstrates that a "closed, opaque container" rule is appropriate, and recommends reappraisal of recent holdings that have been reached under the
expectation of privacy approach.
I.

The Fourth Amendment and Privacy

Fourth Amendment analysis has traditionally involved two determinations: first, whether a claim falls within the Amendment's scope,'" and
second, whether the government has complied with the Amendment's protective requirements." Over time, the Supreme Court has developed a
strict warrant requirement as the primary means of ensuring that the
Amendment's protective commands are complied with by executive officers. Yet today some courts are acting to forego the warrant requirement
in cases in which they determine that only "lesser" privacy interests
within the scope of the Fourth Amendment have been violated.
A.

The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test

Although the Fourth Amendment by its terms protects property, 4 it has
long been recognized that the Amendment functions to protect privacy as
well. 5 In the landmark decision of Katz v. United States,' the Supreme
Court held that privacy interests could be protected under the Fourth
Amendment even when no property rights were infringed." Specifically,
12. Only actions that constitute "searches" or "seizures" are restricted by the Fourth Amendment.
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9, 15 (1973) (by implication); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16
(1968).
13. The Fourth Amendment governs the conduct only of government agents and not that of private parties. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
The only explicit requirement of the Fourth Amendment is that searches and seizures must not be
"unreasonable." The Supreme Court has held, however, that two further nontextual Fourth Amendment requirements must be met for most searches and seizures: probable cause, see Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) (noting "true rule" that searches and seizures "made upon probable
cause . . . are valid"); accord, Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 90-91 (1979); see note 30 infra (defining probable cause); and use of prior warrants, see pp. 316-18 infra (describing development and
components of warrant requirement).
14. The Amendment guarantees the security of "persons, houses, papers, and effects." U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.
15. See note 3 supra (citing authorities); pp. 319-21 infra (discussing protective value of warrants
for privacy).
16. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
17. Id. at 352-53. This decision to abandon a purely property-based analysis of Fourth Amendment claims had been foreshadowed in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967) ("The premise
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the Court ruled that Katz had an interest in the confidentiality of his
telephone conversations that was protected against warrantless wiretapping, even though his calls were made from a public phone booth."8 By
protecting this privacy interest, the Court enlarged the Fourth Amendment's protective scope to encompass governmental intrusions in any private context.19
Concurring in Katz, Justice Harlan advanced the now-familiar twopart "reasonable expectation of privacy" test as a means of identifying
protected Fourth Amendment claims: first, the expectation must be an
"actual" one, subjectively held by the person affected by the search; second, the expectation must be "one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable.' "20 Despite its origin in a concurring opinion, this reasonable
expectation of privacy formula has emerged as the judicial "lodestar" for
current Fourth Amendment analysis."
B.

The Warrant Requirement and Protection of Privacy

In the wake of this relatively recent shift to a focus on privacy, some
courts have suggested that a strict requirement of prior warrants is unnecessary in Fourth Amendment analysis when the privacy interests at stake
are perceived to be small or unimportant. 22 In order to adequately evaluthat property interests control the right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited."),
and in Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) ("Fourth Amendment rights are not
inevitably measurable in terms of ancient niceties of. . .real property law.") The proper relationship
between property and privacy claims in Fourth Amendment analysis remains unclear, however. Compare Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (standing denied because no property interest shown) with
Rawlings v. Kentucky 448 U.S. 98 (1980) (standing denied despite showing of property interest). See
generally Note, Property Law and Fourth Amendment Privacy Protection, 58 NEB. L. REV. 1123
(1979).
18. 389 U.S. at 351-52.
19. By holding that the Fourth Amendment "protects people, not places," 389 U.S. at 351, the
Court in Katz expressly rejected suggestions in earlier decisions that the Amendment's protections
attached only in certain "constitutionally protected areas," see, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41,
57, 59 (1967); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-36 (1942).
20. 389 U.S. at 361.
21. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739 (1979). Soon after the phrase was suggested by Justice
Harlan in his concurrence to Katz, 389 U.S. at 361, a majority of the Court adopted the reasonable
expectation of privacy test in Terry v. Ohio, 302 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) ("[Wjherever an individual may
harbor a reasonable 'expectation of privacy,' he is entitled to be free from unreasonable government
intrusion.") (citation omitted). The Court has subsequently used "legitimate" or "justifiable" in place
of reasonable, but apparently intends all three terms to be synonymous in the expectation of privacy
context. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (protection under Fourth Amendment
"depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a 'justifiable,' a 'reasonable,' or a
'legitimate expectation of privacy' ").
Despite its current "lodestar" status, the reasonable expectation of privacy test has been the object
of strong and continuing academic criticism. See, e.g., Amsterdam, Perspectiveson the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 383-86 (1974); Walinski & Tucker, Expectations of Privacy: Fourth
Amendment Legitimacy Through State Law, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 2-4 (1981); Note, A
Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 MICH. L. REV. 154, 157-70 (1977).
22. See pp. 322-26 infra (discussing emergence of lesser expectation of privacy exception to warrant requirement).

Privacy
ate this development, it is helpful to review the warrant process and the
protections it provides for privacy.
The warrant process has long been a familiar component of Fourth
Amendment analysis. 23 Although the precise function of warrants is not
self-evident from the text of the Amendment, the Supreme Court has concluded that to comply with the spirit of the Amendment, law enforcement
officers must generally obtain a warrant from a neutral judicial officer
before conducting any search or seizure. 4 Under this doctrine, warrantless
searches and seizures are "per se unreasonable, ' 25 and the warrant requirement will be waived only under a few "carefully and jealously
drawn" exceptions-circumstances in which compliance with the warrant
26
process would exact some heavy social cost.
23. The Framers were familiar with the concept of obtaining prior authorization to search and
seize, because warrants were used in Great Britain and America long before the Fourth Amendment
was written. By the late seventeenth century, the Lord Chief Justice of the King's Bench, Sir Matthew Hale, had already written a treatise recommending a judicially-supervised warrant system embodying requirements of probable cause and particularity. See M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 110-14, 149r-51 (1st Am. ed. Philadelphia 1847) (1st ed. London 1736). The
warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment, therefore, did not embody a completely new concept, and
its specifics were designed to prohibit the use of hated "general" warrants or writs of assistance,
which had been issuable by agents of the King or legislature and had given officers blanket authority
to search without cause. See generally N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, reprinted in 55 JOHNS HOPKINS U.
STUD. HIST. & POL. SCI., No. 2, at 34-105 (1937); T. TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 24-41 (1969). Early Fourth Amendment cases referred to the warrant process and
its requirements with familiarity, see, e.g., Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877); Ex parte
Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448, 451 (1806).
24. The Fourth Amendment does not specify how its commands are to be followed or enforced,
and its text has been criticized as "brief, vague, general, [and] unilluminating." Amsterdam, supra
note 21, at 353-354. Accord, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 484 (1971) (noting "uncertain mandate" of Fourth Amendment); Weinreb, Generalitiesof the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI.
L. REV. 47, 47 (1974) (Fourth Amendment is "one of the Constitution's richly generative texts ....
[and) does not answer specific questions"). The initial clause of the Amendment forbids "unreasonable" searches and seizures, while the second clause prescribes certain requirements for valid warrants
without indicating when or whether warrants are required. Consequently, the proper relationship
between the two clauses has been vigorously contested. Compare T. TAYLOR, supra note 23, at 41
(Fourth Amendment should not be read to require warrants, because Framers intended only to restrict use of "overreaching warrants" and "were not concerned about warrantless searches") with
Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 414 (warrant requirement is correct result of "sound constitutional
logic") and Stelzner, The Fourth Amendment: The Reasonableness and Warrant Clauses, 10 NEW
MEX. L. REV. 33, 40 (1979-80) (historical evidence indicates that First Congress intended that
Fourth Amendment would require warrants). Since its decision thirteen years ago in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969) (finding "general requirement that a search warrant be obtained"),
however, the Supreme Court has steadfastly held that a valid warrant must be obtained before a
search or seizure is conducted, unless substantial justifications are presented for foregoing the warrant
process. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2862 (1981) (warrant requirement is "a first
principle of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence"); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759 (1979)
(noting "prominent place the warrant requirement is given" in Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment
decisions).
25. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); accord Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,
390 (1978); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971).
26. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1959); accord Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753,
759-60 (1979); United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318, 320-21 (1972). See
pp. 321-22 infra (discussing exceptions to warrant requirement).
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The basic warrant procedure is uncomplicated.2 7 To obtain a valid warrant, a law enforcement officer must demonstrate to a judicial officer 28
through sworn affadavits29 that probable cause3" exists to believe that
criminal contraband or evidence will be found at a particular location." If
factors of time or distance make the requirement of in-person written affidavits impracticable, oral testimony may be substituted via telephone or
other communicative device. 2 Because officers are permitted to act immediately without a warrant whenever delay might result in harm to others
27. Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the issuance and execution of
federal search and seizure warrants. Most states have enacted similar rules. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE
§§ 1523-1542 (West 1970 & Supp. 1981); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 690.05-690.55 (McKinney
1971 & Supp. 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 38, §§ 108-3 through 108-14 (Smith-Hurd 1980 & Supp.
1981).
28. Either a federal magistrate or a "judge of a state court of record" may issue a federal search
warrant upon sworn affidavits. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(a). Only federal magistrates, however, may
authorize warrants upon oral testimony. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2)(A). In no case may search warrants be issued by persons other than "neutral judicial officers." See p. 319 infra (discussing requirement of neutral judicial officers).
29. The Fourth Amendment requires that warrants be "supported by Oath or affirmation," U.S.
CONST. amend. IV, to ensure that "someone. . . take the responsibility for the facts alleged." United
States ex rel. Pugh v. Pate, 401 F.2d 6, 7 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 999 (1969); see also
Frazier v. Roberts, 441 F.2d 1224, 1228 (8th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (unsworn assertions "for which
the informing officer takes no moral or legal responsibility" are insufficient to support warrant).
30. "[P]robable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception," Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, 176 (1949), and facts constituting probable cause will differ from case to case. The best general
definition is still that which may be gleaned from Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149, 162
(1925):
[Probable cause is] a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that [the area to be searched[ contains that which by law is subject to seizure . . . . This
is to say . . . where the facts and circumstances within their [the officers') knowledge . . .
were sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that [contraband or evidence would be found in the area searched].
Probable cause requires "'less than evidence which would justify condemnation' or conviction," but
"more than bare suspicion." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (quoting Locke v.
United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348 (1813)).
31. The Fourth Amendment requires that warrants "particularly describ[e] the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See p. 320 infra (discussing
particularity requirement).
32. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2). Similar provisions have been enacted by some states, see, e.g.,
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3914(c) (West 1978 & Supp. 1981); CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1526(b),
1528(b) (West Supp. 1981). Such "telephonic warrants" significantly reduce the time required to
obtain a warrant. See Miller, Telephonic Search Warrants: The San Diego Experience, 9 PROSECU.
TOR 385, 385-86 (1973) ("search warrants [are] issued in minutes rather than hours" via oral warrant
system). According to the former San Diego District Attorney, "65% of all telephonic search warrants
take one hour or less [to obtain] . . . . Most of the remaining 35% are completed in less than 2
hours," and longer delay is frequently attributable to factors extraneous to the warrant procedure. Id.
Accord, Note, Oral Search Warrants:A New Standard of Warrant Availability,21 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
691, 694 n.23 (1973) (citing cases where telephonic warrants were obtained in 12 and 34 minutes).
Because oral testimony reduces demeanor evidence available to the magistrate and may also make the
probable cause determination more difficult in complex cases, however, telephonic warrants may be
used only in situations where time or distance would make use of the conventional procedure unreasonable. See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(2)(A) (Advisory Committee Notes to 1977 Amendment); Israel, Legislative Regulation of Searches and Seizures: The Michigan Proposals,73 MICH. L.
REV. 221, 258-63 (1974).

Privacy
or loss or destruction of evidence,33 the only cost of the warrant process in
theory is the administrative expense of compliance to law enforcement
agencies."
The primary value of the warrant requirement lies in its function as a
judicial limitation on executive discretion, in the constitutional tradition of
separation of powers. 5 Only a neutral judicial officer, detached from "the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime," is permitted to issue a
warrant.36 The presumption is that a magistrate will refuse the warrant
for unreasonable searches that overzealous officers might otherwise have
conducted."
33. See p. 322 & note 49 infra (discussing "exigent circumstances" exception to warrant
requirement).
34. The Supreme Court has stated that the "burden imposed on the police by a warrant requirement is minimal." Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 222 (1981). No empirical research has
been done concerning the costs involved, see note 110 infra, however, and reported cases reveal that
the time required to obtain a search warrant upon written affidavit can vary widely. Compare Barajas
v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. App. 3d 185, 188, 88 Cal. Rptr. 730, 731 (1970) (less than 2.5 hours) with
United States v. Van Lecuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 250 253 (1970) (between 7 and 29 hours). The amount
of delay, however, is usually stated in terms of hours, rather than days or some longer measure. See
Griswold, CriminalProcedure, 1969-Is It a Means or an End? 29 MD. L. REV. 317 (1969); Note,
supra note 32, at 693 n.18.
Nevertheless, the "most frequent police objection to the use of search warrants is that the application process is too time-consuming." Israel, supra note 32, at 256. Besides delays in the normal process itself, long distances between law enforcers and magistrates in rural areas, or unavailability of
magistrates, may lengthen the application period. See Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841, 2852
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (scarcity of magistrates in southwestern "cow counties" makes warrant requirement burdensome); FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (Advisory Committee Notes to 1977 Amendment) (noting "administrative difficulties involved in getting a warrant, particularly at times of the
day when a judicial officer is ordinarily unavailable").
Since 1977, however, the availability of telephonic warrants has significantly reduced the time burdens involved in seeking warrants, see note 32 supra; cf Miller, supra note 32, at 385-86 (telephone
warrant system "operates in a quick and simple manner," and "greatly expanded the total number of
search warrants issued" in San Diego). Thus, the Supreme Court has judicially noted the availability
of telephonic warrants when stating that "the short time required to obtain a search warrant . . . will
seldom hinder [law enforcementi efforts." Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 222 (1981).
35. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972) (" judicial role" in
warrant process accords with "our basic constitutional doctrine" of "separation of powers").
36. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); accord,United States v. United States Dist.
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316 (1972) ("Inherent in the concept of a warrant is its issuance by a 'neutral
and detached magistrate.' "); cf Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971) (warrant
invalid because issued by state Attorney General who was "chief investigator and prosecutor" in case).
37. Cf United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972) ("The historical
judgement . . . is that unreviewed executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures to obtain
incriminating evidence and overlook potential invasions of privacy.") This presumption has been
questioned on the ground that many persons who are empowered to issue warrants actually exercise
little discretion and issue warrants as a matter of course. See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct.
2841, 2852 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing warrant requirement in light of previous
Supreme Court decision that permits city clerks who are "not trained in the law" to issue warrants);
Miller & Tiffany, Prosecutor Dominance of the Warrant Decision: A Study of Current Practices,
1964 WASH. U.L.Q. I (empirical evidence suggests that magistrates perform little screening). Such
criticism, however, does not disprove the validity of the theory, but rather indicates only that its
implementation ought to be improved. See Note, supra note 32, at 691-92 n.4 (response to inadequacies of magistrate review should not be to discontinue review of police actions, but rather to develop
"clear standards of review" to guide magistrates); d. Yackle, The Burger Court and the Fourth
Amendment, 26 U. KAN. L. REV. 335, 415 (1978) (if Supreme Court strictly enforced a clear warrant
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The particularity requirement of the warrant clause further limits executive discretion by placing specific boundaries on the scope of an intrusive
action."' By limiting the objects and parameters of a search, this aspect of
the warrant requirement prevents indiscriminate "general" searches of the
character that most motivated the Framers to include the Fourth Amendment in the Bill of Rights. 9
The value of the warrant requirement in protecting privacy is clearest
when the process is compared to its likely alternative: after-the-fact judicial review of a search or seizure for "reasonableness. "4 It is vital to recognize that privacy, once disturbed, cannot be restored in the same way
that wrongfully-seized property can be returned if a post-search reviewer
finds that "the constable blundered."4 1 A prior determination of the reasonableness of and probable cause for a search is therefore of critical importance in protecting privacy. Furthermore, prior review avoids the "farequirement, "judicial supervision might yet become effective despite the shortcomings of the past").
38. "A search for a stolen horse, for example, could not include the shredding of a bedroom
mattress." Greenawalt, The Right of Privacy, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS 299, 306 (N. Dorsen
ed. 1970). See, e.g., Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 325 (1979) (striking down "open
ended" warrant whose terms left scope of search "entirely to the discretion of the officials conducting
the search"); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 58-60 (1967) (striking down "permissive eavesdropping" statute because it "authorize[d] the 'indiscriminate use' of electronic devices" and gave officials
"roving commission" to eavesdrop).
39. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1977) ("It cannot be doubted that the Fourth
Amendment's commands grew in large measure out of the colonists' experience with writs of assistance and their memories of the general warrants formerly in use in England."); see generally N.
LASSON, supra note 23, at 57-81 (discussing writs of assistance and general warrants).
40. Courts may review police actions either in a criminal setting-for example, a suppression
hearing or trial-or in a civil action brought by the victim of a suit against the searching officer or
officers. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (Fourth Amendment creates
cause of action for damages if violated). Knowledge that their actions may be subject to such postsearch review may encourage law enforcement officers to act reasonably, and thus provide some measure of protection for privacy interests. Such foreknowledge will provide no privacy protection against
intrusive actions taken in good faith, however. Cf Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 n.12
(1969) ("The [Fourth] Amendment is designed to prevent, not simply to redress, unlawful police
action.") Furthermore, civil actions against offending officers are unlikely to provide much relief,
because good faith is a defense to such actions and courts pay great deference to law enforcement
officers. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 216 n.9 (1981) (noting "pitfalls and limitations"
of Fourth Amendment civil actions); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 456 F.2d 1339, 1347 (2d
Cir. 1972) (on remand from Supreme Court) (granting good faith defense to federal officers in Fourth
Amendment civil action because officers, "whose lives are in constant danger. . . , perform functions
indispensable to the preservation of our American way of life"). In a criminal setting, the remedy for
Fourth Amendment violation is exclusion of illegally seized evidence along with its fruits from use at
trial. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Again,
good faith may be a bar to this remedy, see Williams v. United States, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980)
(en bane) (per curiam), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981) (refusing to apply exclusionary rule when
officers acted in good faith).
41. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587, 214 N.Y.S. (Cardozo, J.), cert. denied,
270 U.S. 657 (1926). As a psychological state, privacy may be damaged irreparably by an unwarranted intrusion; an individual may return to a state of privacy after a disruption, but lost privacy
cannot be restored. See note 43 infra (discussing psychological implications of privacy invasion). Because property is concrete, it is substantially unaffected by a temporary seizure, and the only irremedial effect is loss of its use during the seizure period.
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miliar shortcomings of hindsight judgement" that may, in close cases, lead
42
courts acting after the fact to rule against apparently guilty defendants.
The warrant procedure is socially valuable even in cases in which an
intrusion on privacy is ultimately permitted. A search by itself is psychologically intrusive, whether or not anything incriminating is actually discovered.43 By providing notice and assurance to the victim that an impending search has been judicially authorized and delimited, a valid warrant
reduces anxiety and the perceived intrusiveness of the action. 44 A postsearch review cannot possibly serve this function.45
C.

The "Lesser Expectation of Privacy" Approach

Despite the protections that a warrant affords, exceptions to the warrant requirement have occasionally been established in order to accomodate other compelling societal needs. 4' Because such exceptions unavoid42. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964); accord, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358
(1967); see United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 565 (1976) (one pupose of warrant requirement is "to prevent hindsight from coloring the evaluation of the reasonableness of a search or
seizure"); cf. Note, Tracking Katz: Beepers, Privacy, and the Fourth Amendment, 86 YALE L.J.
1461, 1476 (1977) ("it is both easy and psychologically appealing" to uphold warrantless searches in
post-search reviews because "[only the guilty appear to be affected").
43. One important component of personal privacy has been described as "interaction management"-that is, control over the circumstances under which an intrusion upon one's privacy occurs.
Laufer & Wolfe, Privacy as a Concept and a Social Issue: A MultidimensionalDevelopmental Theor, 33 J. Soc. ISSUES, No. 3, at 22, 33-35 (1977) (coining term). To be psychologically complete,
therefore, privacy requires choice or control over when, where, how and with whom an individual will
interact. Id. at 37-39; accord, A. WESTIN, supra note 4, at 39-42 (for mental stability and personal
development, individuals need to control their environments to avoid having "too much" or "too little"
privacy); Shils, Privacy: Its Constitution and Vicissitudes, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 281, 282-83
(1966) ("voluntary consent" concerning intrusions is "essential component" of privacy). The victim of
a police search has no control over the timing, methods, or scope of the search. This absence of control
causes anxiety, even if the victim has nothing incriminating to hide. Furthermore, because privacy is
necessary to the development of personal autonomy, sense of self-worth, and interpersonal relationships, see note 4 supra, an involutary disruption of privacy by police may be damaging in other ways.
44. See, e.g., Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323 (1978) (providing "assurances from a
neutral officer" that search is reasonable and judicially authorized, and notice to owner of "scope and
objects of the search . . . are important functions for a warrant to perform"); Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33 (1967) (warrant protects householders by informing them that administrative search is required and limited by law, and has been authorized by judicial officer); cf United
States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972) (one value served by warrant requirement in context of domestic national security cases is "reassurance of the public generally that indiscriminate wiretapping and bugging of law-abiding citizens cannot occur").
45. In addition to providing added protection for privacy, the warrant process avoids excessive
resort to the exclusionary penalty of Mapp. v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1967) (illegally seized evidence is
inadmissible in subsequent criminal prosecution), by ensuring that officers do not search or seize
unreasonably or without probable cause.
46. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 760 (1979) ("[W]e have limited the reach of each
exception to that which is necessary to accomodate the identified needs of society.") Established exceptions to the warrant requirement may be roughly divided among three general categories: "consent,"
"administrative searches" and "exigent circumstances." Cf Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 358-60
(separating exceptions into categories of "consent," "limited . . . routine searches," and "circumstances of haste").
Consent to a search eliminates the need for a warrant, and may be proffered by the party affected
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ably entail a reduced degree of protection for the privacy interests at stake,
however, their bounds are "strictly circumscribed," 47 and "the burden is
on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it."4 In criminal law,
the most common and important exception arises in "exigent" circumstances, situations where contraband or evidence might be lost or destroyed, or persons might be harmed, if officers were to delay in order to
seek a warrant. The Supreme Court has refused to create exceptions
when a demonstrated need is judged less compelling, however, 0 and has
never held that the administrative cost of warrants alone is reason enough
to forego their use."
Yet the Supreme Court has recently implied that certain expectations of
privacy will not be protected by the warrant requirement, even when the
traditional exceptions are inapplicable. In a line of decisions beginning
with Chambers v. Maroney,s2 the Court has upheld warrantless searches
or a third party with some measure of authority over the area searched. See United States v. Matlock,
415 U.S. 164, 171 & n.7 (1974) (wife's consent to search common bedroom); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (personal consent).
Administrative searches are those conducted to achieve a valid public purpose in a noncriminal
context according to a previously established routine procedure. See, e.g., United States v. MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556, (1976) (routine warrantless motor vehicle stops at fixed checkpoints justified by the "substantiality of the public interest" in checking "flow of illegal aliens"); South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976) (routine inventory searches of impounded vehicles justified "in
response to three distinct needs": protection of police from danger and from false claims of theft, and
protection of property left in such vehicles); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972) (warrantless inspections of gun shops justified as a "crucial part" of "federal efforts to prevent violent
crime"). Routine procedures and a noncriminal context are not sufficient justification for an administrative search exception, however; it must also be demonstrated that enforcement of the warrant requirement would frustrate the claimed public purpose or be inappropriate in the context at issue. The
Court has thus denied warrant requirement exceptions in some administrative contexts. See, e.g.,
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (OSHA inspections); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S.
541 (1967) (fire code inspections of commercial buildings); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967) (housing code inspections).
Exceptions based on exigent circumstances are discussed in note 49 infra.
47. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968); accord, Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 760 (1979).
48. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951); accord, Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,
390-91 (1978).
49. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (in conjunction with arrest, police may
search "area from within which [arrestee] might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence"). Exceptions based upon exigent circumstances include "hot pursuit," see Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967) (warrantless entrance and search of residence after police were informed
that armed robber had entered five minutes earlier), "stop and frisk," see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
27 (1968) (frisk of suspicious individual on street for weapons), incident to arrest (see Chimel supra);
and the original "automobile exception," see Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (stop and
search of vehicle in transit based on probable cause where failure to stop and search would result in
loss of contraband); see note 53 infra (discussing Carroll).
50. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) (refusing general exception for search
of homicide scenes, sought on basis of the "public interest in the prompt investigation" of homicides);
United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318-21 (1972) (refusing general exception
for electronic surveillance of domestic organizations, sought on basis of governmental interest in preserving national security).
51. See p. 331 & note 90 infra (citing Supreme Court cases).
52. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
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of automobiles that took place in the absence of any exigency.13 After experimenting with a series of unsatisfactory explanations for this result, 4
the Court in 1974 announced a novel justification: such non-exigent
searches are permissible because people hold a "lesser expectation of privacy" in their automobiles than in their homes.'- Despite the unsecure
underpinnings of this rationale56 and the substantial academic criticism
that this new "automobile exception" has received, 7 the Court has contin53. Warrantless automobile searches first received constitutional scrutiny in Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). There the Supreme Court, taking judicial notice of the difficulties of
Prohibition enforcement, the mobility of automobiles, and their common use in transporting contraband liquor, held that government agents without a warrant could stop and search a vehicle on the
highway if they had probable cause to believe that the automobile contained contraband. Id. at 153,
155. This holding was consistent with the rule that exigent circumstances justify a warrantless search,
see p. 322 supra, because the automobile was not otherwise subject to police seizure and could have
been quickly driven out of the jurisdiction, thereby causing a loss of suspected contraband. Through
inexact analysis over the years, however, this holding has been transformed into a generic exception to
the warrant requirement for automobiles, regardless of exigency. Cf Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S.
433, 442-443 (1973) ("[W]arrantless searches of vehicles have been sustained in cases in which the
possibility of the vehicle's being removed or evidence in it destroyed were remote, if not non-existent."). For thorough coverage of this legal doctrine, see generally Robb, The Carroll Case: The
Expansion of the Automobile Exception in Warrantless Search and Seizure Cases, 15 WILLAMiETTE
L. REV. 39 (1978); Moylan, The Automobile Exception: What It Is and What It Is Not-A Rationale in Search of a ClearerLabel, 27 MERCER L. REV. 987 (1976).
54. See, e.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439-41 (1973) (asserting "constitutional difference between houses and cars" based on "extensive regulation" of, and "frequency" of police contact
with, automobiles); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 279 (1973) (Powell, J. concurring) (suggesting without citation or explanation that warrantless "search of an automobile is far less
intrusive . . . than the search of one's person or of a building"); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42,
51-52 (1970) (mobility of impounded automobile somehow "still obtain[s] at the stationhouse," and
that it is "debatable" whether "lesser intrusion" would be continuing impoundment until warrant was
obtained, or immediate warrantless search).
55. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) ("One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a
motor vehicle becuase its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the
repository of personal effects.")
56. Cardwell was only a plurality opinion, and Justice Blackmun's reference to the alleged "lesser
expectation of privacy" in automobiles was dictum. See id. at 591-92 (upholding warrantless taking of
tire tread impressions and paint scrapings from car's exterior on ground that defendant had no expectation of privacy with regard to his car's exterior). Justice Blackmun expressly limited his holding to
automobile exteriors, stating that he did not intend "to say that no part of the interior of an automobile has Fourth Amendment protection." Id. at 591. Finally, the only support Justice Blackmun offered for the notion of "lesser" privacy in automobiles was Justice Powell's concurrence in AlmeidaSanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 279 (1973), see note 54 supra, and an arcane 1922 state court
decision, People v. Case, 220 Mich. 379, 190 N.W. 289, that had relied on pre-Katz notions to hold
that "[tihe automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle of recent development" whose "active use is not
in homes nor on private premises, the privacy of which the law especially guards." 220 Mich. at 388,
190 N.W. at 292. The opinion in People v. Case was subsequently declared "thoroughly vitiated" by
the Michigan Supreme Court. People v. Ubbes, 374 Mich. 571, 594, 132 N.W.2d 669, 681 (opinion
of Souris, J.) (1965). It should be noted that sociological evidence belies a generalized finding that
automobile owners do not expect much privacy in their vehicles. See note 140 infra.
57. See, e.g., Wilson, The Warrantless Automobile Search: Exception Without Justification, 32
HASTINGS L.J. 127, 129-30, 158-62 (1980); Yackle, supra note 37, at 404-415; Note, Warrantless
Searchesand Seizures of Automobiles, 87 HARV. L. REV. 835, 840-41 & n.28 (1974); Comment, The
Automobile Exception: A Contradiction in Fourth Amendment Principles, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
933, 936 (1980).
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ued to rely on this lesser expectation analysis to uphold non-exigent, warrantless vehicle searches.5 8
Counterposed to these automobile cases are the more recent decisions in
United States v. Chadwick" and Arkansas v. Sanders." These cases hold
that warrantless searches of luggage are impermissible in non-exigent circumstances because "a person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.""
Although the Court has not straightforwardly contrasted the underlying
analyses of these luggage and automobile decisions, the holdings appear to
indicate that the Court has implicitly identified two points on a hierarchical scale of privacy interests, placing those attributed to automobiles near
one end and those associated with luggage nearer the other.6 2 "Lesser"
expectations of privacy are not protected by the warrant requirement,
while "greater" expectations are fully protected from warrantless intrusion. Although the Supreme Court has explicitly employed this analysis
only in cases involving automobiles, 6 lower courts have applied the lesser
58. See Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841, 2845 (1981) (plurality opinion) (referring with
approval to the "automobile exception . . . supported by 'the diminished expectation of privacy which
surrounds the automobile' ") (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977)).
59. 433 U.S. 1 (1977) (holding warrantless search of lawfully seized, locked 200-lb. footlocker
unconstitutional).
60. 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (holding warrantless search of lawfully seized, unlocked suitcase
unconstitutional).
61. Chadwick v. United States, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977); accord,Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753,
761 (1979).
62. For other decisions implying this conclusion, see Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841, 2850
n.3 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring) (dividing containers into three groups for purposes of Fourth
Amendment analysis: those "inevitably associated with expectations of privacy;" those that "consistently lack such an association;" and "ambigous" containers "in the middle"); Walter v. United States,
447 U.S. 649, 658 (1980) ("securely wrapped" cartons are subject to warrant requirement because
owners had no "lesser expectation of privacy than the [owner] of an ordinary locked suitcase"); cf
Recent Development, 55 WASH. L. REV. 871, 882 (1980) (speculating that Sanders decision may
indicate that "the Court anticipates some gradation of the privacy interest in various containers and
packages").
63. But cf Michigan v. Summers, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 2592 (1981) (upholding standard of less than
probable cause for warrantless detention of persons on premises of house about to be searched pursuant to search warrant, because such seizures constitute "limited intrusions on the personal security of
those detained"); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979) (upholding warrantless searches of pretrial detainees based in part on "diminished expectation of privacy" in custodial facilities and in part
on special conditions present in criminal detention process).
In Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981), the Court exhibited indecision with regard to
extending the lesser expectation of privacy analysis to other areas. At issue was the non-exigent,
warrantless search of irregularly-shaped packages seized from an automobile luggage compartment
and wrapped and taped shut in opaque plastic. A plurality of four Justices held the search unconstitutional, agreeing that all "closed, opaque containers" mainfest constitutionally protected privacy interests and thus apparently rejecting the lesser expectations approach. Id. at 2846. Chief Justice Burger
concurred in the judgement without opinion. Id. at 2847. Concurring, Justice Powell explicitly advocated applying a hierarchical privacy scale. Id. at 2850; see note 62 supra (quoting from Justice
Powell's concurring opinion). Finally, three Justices dissented in separate opinions, all apparently
rejecting a hierarchical approach and advocating a bright-line rule permitting a warrantless search of
any containers discovered in a lawfully seized and searchable automobile. See id. at 2581 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting); id. at 2853 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 2855 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Lower
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expectations approach to searches of other objects and areas, with confused and conflicting results.4
The court has offered little explanation for its decision to forego the
warrant requirement in non-exigent automobile searches, other than the
6
bald assertion that the privacy interests affected are relatively minors.
By
failing to identify any countervailing societal needs served by the lesser
expectation of privacy exception, the Court has violated the settled Fourth
Amendment doctrine that exceptions to the warrant requirement are permitted only to accomodate the "identified needs of society,"' 6 and that the
government must bear the burden of proving that an exception is
necessary. 7
courts have disagreed over how the Robbins decisions should be interpreted. Compare United States v.
Weber, 664 F.2d 841, 851 & n.7 (1st Cir. 1981) (upholding Robbins closed opaque container rule, on
view that Justice Powell alone supported hierarchical approach) and United States v. Monclavo-Cruz,
662 F.2d 1285, 1287 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1981) (same) with United States v. Martino, 664 F.2d 860, 87273 (2d Cir. 1981) (adopting Justice Powell's hierarchical approach as "holding" of Robbins, because
it represented narrowest ground of majority opinions). The Supreme Court may clarify its views
regarding a hierarchical approach to privacy protection under the Fourth Amendment in the 1981
term, in Ross v. United States, 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 386
(1981) (appeal from holding that warrant requirement applies to paper bag lawfully seized from
automobile, parties "directed to address the question whether the Court should reconsider Robbins").
64. Most commonly the lesser expectations approach has been applied to reviews of warrantless
searches of containers. See notes 104, 105 & 132 infra ( noting conflicting container search decisions).
Courts have also applied the analysis to searches of areas such as scientific laboratories, see United
States v. Buettner-Janusch, 646 F.2d 759, 766 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 126 (1981), vessels
at sea, see United States v. Ortega, 644 F.2d 512, 514-15 (5th Cir. 1981), and commercial premises at
night, see Alaska v. Myers, 601 P.2d 239, 242-43 (Alaska 1979).
65. The Court has hinted that difficulties surrounding seizure and storage of automobiles due to
their size might also support an automobile exception. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 765-66
n.14 (1979) (strict warrant requirement for lawfully seized automobiles might create "severe, even
impossible, burdens on many police departments" by making necessary adequate towing equipment,
safe storage lots, and extra personnel). But see Comment, supra note 57, at 954 (police departments
may in fact have adequate facilities for temporary automobile impoundment while warrants are
sought). If the Court intends to rely on the Sanders dictum, however, it has so far failed to say so
explicitly, and has rested its distinction between automobiles and luggage solely on supposed privacy
differences. See p. 322-24 supra. Moreover, even if such practical difficulties may be held to support a
general-automobile exception, the reasoning fails to distinguish luggage from other, smaller containers
that lower courts have held excepted from the warrant requirement. See notes 104 & 132 infra (citing
cases).
66. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 760 (1979); cf United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15
(1977) (warrant is required whenever "no exigency is shown to support the need for an immediate
search").
67. The lack of demonstrated justification for a lesser expectation of privacy exception to the
warrant requirement forces defendants to demonstrate not only that their privacy has been invaded,
but also that their interest in that privacy rises to some undefined level of intensity or importance, in
order to be fully protected by the Fourth Amendment. Although the Supreme Court noted in Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1979), that the "proponent of a motion to dismiss has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated," id. at 130-31 n.1, this merely "reaffirmed
the established rule" that a defendant must show that "challenged conduct invaded his legitimate
expectation of privacy rather than that of a third party." United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731
(1980). Thus the government should still have to justify warrantless intrusions on personal privacy.
Several respected jurists have noted the implicit break with settled doctrine that an unjustified lesser
expectation of privacy exception entails. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, No. 79-1624, slip op. at 3
(D.C. Cir. April 17, 1980) (Bazelon, J., dissenting), rev'd en bane, 655 F.2d 11, cert. granted, 102 S.
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Moreover, the recognition of lesser expectations of privacy cannot be
dismissed simply as an implicit holding that certain expectations of privacy are "unreasonable." If this were the case, the Court could simply
hold that such expectations fall completely outside the scope of the Fourth
Amendment and are therefore wholly unprotected. The Court has steadfastly maintained, however, that individuals do retain privacy interests in
their automobiles," and continues to judge automobile searches according
to the Amendment's reasonableness and probable cause standards. The
inescapable conclusion is that the Court is recognizing a new exception to
the warrant requirement sub silentio, uniquely grounded not on exigent
necessity or other demonstrable societal need, but solely on the perceived
insignificance of certain types of privacy interests.69
II.

A Critique of Current Privacy Analysis

The expectation of privacy approach to claims under the Fourth
Amendment may be criticized on three general grounds. First, using a
concept of "reasonable expectations" to identify privacy confuses analysis
and permits manipulation of privacy protection. Second, a single valueordered hierarchy of privacy interests that is fair cannot be developed, and
would be unworkable in any case. Finally, a Fourth Amendment analysis
that denies warrant protection to those privacy interests labeled "lesser"
merely because the warrant process involves some cost to law enforcers is
constitutionally impermissible.
Ct. 386 (1981) (panel takes "entirely novel approach" because "[ilnstead of requiring those seeking an
exemption from the warrant requirement to show the need for one, the majority would ask the defendant . . . to demonstrate . . . that his personal possessions should be entitled to the protection of the
Fourth Amendment"); United States v. Mackey, 626 F.2d 684, 688 (9th Cir. 1980) (Tang, J., dissenting) (by presuming that burden is on defendant in paper bag search case, majority "inverts...
the correct analytic approach").
68. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979) ("An individual operating or traveling in
an automobile does not lose all reasonable expectation of privacy."); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S.
891, 896 (1975) ("A search, even of an automobile, is a substantial invasion of privacy."); cf Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461-62 (1971) (plurality opinion) ("The word 'automobile' is not a
talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears.")
69. Cf United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert.. granted, 102
S. Ct. 386 (1981) (by seeking warrant exception for "unworthy containers" based on lesser expectations of privacy, "the prosecution asks, in essence, that we delineate a new exception").
The possibility of basing Fourth Amendment protection on a hierarchical conception of privacy has
been briefly noted but rejected out of hand in the past. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.
364, 386 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for appearing to suggest that
automobiles may be warrantlessly searched for "less compelling" reasons than may houses due to a
'diminished' expectation of privacy," and declaring that "[t]his has never been the law"); Weinreb,
supra note 24, at 70, 75 ("[ijf one took seriously" Court's decisions regarding non-exigent warrantless
automobile searches, they could support "doctrine of degrees of privacy," but "[c]onstitutionally, there
are no degrees of privacy").

Privacy
A.

Abandoning Reasonable Expectations in Favor of Privacy Interests

The explicit focus on privacy in Katz represented an important advance
in Fourth Amendment analysis.70 Nevertheless, Justice Harlan's reasonable expectation of privacy formula has become a manipulable and restrictive analytical tool for identifying privacy concerns that fall within the
Amendment's protective scope." A pure concept of privacy interests based
upon an objective definition of privacy should instead be the focus of
Fourth Amendment analysis.
1. The Problem with Reasonable Expectations
Initially, the reasonable expectation of privacy test requires an individual to have an "actual expectation" of privacy before he can claim Fourth
Amendment protection.7 2 Expectations of privacy, however, are not necessarily coextensive with privacy per se. Critics have noted that such subjective perceptions can be manipulated by the government; in various Orwellian73 hypotheticals, persons might not actually expect privacy in
circumstances where a normative interest in privacy is clearly identifiable. Conversely, an irrational individual might actually expect privacy
in situations where no true privacy claim can be said to exist.
70. The value of Katz has been well-noted. See Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 383, 385 (Katz is
"seminal" and "important for its rejection of several limitations upon the operation" of Fourth
Amendment); Note, The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy-Katz v. United States, A Postscriptum,
9 IND. L. REV. 468, 498 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Postscriptum] (Katz a "milestone" because it
enabled "legal protection to conform to changing times and technology"); Note, supra note 42, at 1470
(insofar as Katz freed privacy protection from property concepts, it represents "an extension of Fourth
Amendment protection").
71. See Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 385 (rejecting "talismanic" application of expectation of
privacy analysis, because it does not offer "comprehensive test of fourth amendment coverage");
Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. L.
J. 329, 335 (1973) (expectations test is "severe restriction on the scope of fourth amendment protection"); see also note 21 supra (listing critical commentators of reasonable expectation of privacy test);
cf Postscriptum, supra note 70, at 498 ("redefinition" of Fourth Amendment privacy analysis may be
necessary after Katz, due to "abstractness" of reasonable expectation of privacy test).
72. See p. 316 supra (describing reasonable expectation of privacy formula).
73. See G. ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 4 (1949):
There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any given moment. . . . It was even conceivable that they watched everybody all the time. . . . You had to
live-did live, from habit that became instinct-in the assumption that every sound you made
was overheard, and . . . every movement scrutinized.
74. See Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 384 (state might eliminate expectations of privacy by making pervasive television announcements that all citizens were "forthwith being placed under comprehensive electronic surveillance"); Note, supra note 21, at 158 (hypothesizing "well publicized" statute
that would require "occupants of automobiles on toll highways to submit to extensive searches of
the[irl vehicles, their persons, and their luggage at selected toll booths"). Such hypotheticals do not
seem so far-fetched in light of recent decisions holding that certain expectations of privacy may be
reduced or eliminated by statute or posted notice. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063,
1087 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) ("[E]xtensive federal and international regulation of shipping and
boating significantly limits the privacy that anyone might expect to have on the seas."); Gillett v.
State, 588 S.W.2d. 361, 363 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (en banc) (posted notice that department store
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Anticipating the latter possibility, the test also requires that actual expectations be "reasonable" to be protected. In practice, courts often simply
presume the existence of an actual expectation and devote their energies to
this second inquiry for reasonableness, making the question of actual expectations totally academic." But to define reasonable expectations as
those which "society is prepared to accept as reasonable" is obviously tautological,7 6 and makes the entire analysis essentially standardless." For
these reasons, the notion of reasonable expectations of privacy should be
abandoned in favor of a pure concept of "privacy interests," in the sense
of claims to privacy to which persons are entitled under the Fourth
Amendment regardless of individual expectations. 8
2.

Defining Privacy

For all its modern concern with privacy, the Supreme Court still has
not arrived at a common, workable definition of privacy." Nevertheless, in
fitting rooms were "under surveillance" eliminated any expectation of privacy of occupants).
Four years after Katz, Justice Harlan dissociated himself from an application of his own reasonable
expectation of privacy test on this very ground. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) ("analysis must, in my view, transcend the search for subjective expectations"
because "expectations . . . are in large part reflections of laws"). The Supreme Court has more
recently noted the possibility of undesirable manipulation of privacy protection under the "expectations" approach, but has advanced no helpful solution. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41
n.5 (1979) (commenting only that if "individual's subjective expectations had been 'conditioned' by
influences alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms, .
a normative inquiry would be
proper").
75. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979) ("jElven if petitioner did harbor some
subjective expectation that the phone numbers he dialed would remain private, this expectation is not
'one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.' "); United States v. Ramapuram, 632 F.2d
1149, 1155 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1739 (1981) ("We assume that Ramapuram had
an actual subjective expectation of privacy".); cf. Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 384 (actual expectation of privacy "can neither add to, nor can its absence detract from, an individual's claim to fourth
amendment protection").
76. Cf Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 385 ("[Tlhe basis of the Katz decision seems to be that the
fourth amendment protects those interests that may justifiably claim fourth amendment protection. Of
course this begs the question.")
77. Numerous critics have noted that the reasonable expectation of privacy test provides "no objective referent" to guide courts or police. Note, supra note 42, at 1474. See, e.g., Walinski & Tucker,
supra note 21, at 2 ("no principled way for judges to determine whether a given expectation of privacy" is reasonable); Yackle, supra note 37, at 362 ("[Tlhere is no more amorphous standard in our
law than 'reasonableness' . . . . The inquiry is unprincipled.")
78. Cf Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 384 (Fourth Amendment rights are not merely subjective
expectations; they are rights that "we should demand of government"); Note, supra note 21, at 171 (if
"expectations" are to determine Fourth Amendment's scope, then "courts must recognize that the core
of the fourth amendment contains a minimum set of expectations to which all persons are entitled").
An "interest" in constitutional law generally is recognized as representing a claim to some right, in
the sense of an entitlement, as in "liberty interest," or "property interest." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 729 (5th ed. 1979) (defining "interest" as "the most general term that can be employed to
denote a right, claim, title, or legal share in something"). A "privacy interest," then, is a claim that
one has privacy or is entitled to have privacy in a particular place or situation; such a claim should
not be dependent on individual subjective desire.
79. Most of the Supreme Court's pronouncements on privacy have come in abortion or sexual
conduct cases, and have been exemplary rather than explanatory. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
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order to give the concept of privacy interests meaningful content for protection of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, the law must reach some
agreement as to what constitutes privacy."0 Such a definition should not be
left open for individual courts to fill on a case-by-case basis;8 some common, objective definition of privacy must be developed if the concept
of "privacy interests" is to be any less manipulable than that of
82
"expectations.

The essence of privacy is twofold: the ability to keep personal information unknown to others and to keep one's self separate from interaction
with others. These basic concepts, which embody the definitions of privacy
proffered by experts in divers fields, can be encapsulated in the phrase
"secrecy and solitude."83 The Fourth Amendment's restrictions on
searches and seizures may in fact be viewed as limitations on the govern464, 472-73 (1977) ("personal privacy" includes "woman's freedom of choice" regarding pregnancy
and abortion); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973) (listing "privacy rights such as those
of marriage, procreation, motherhood, child rearing and education"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (right to privacy includes "notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship"). See also pp. 313-14 supra (discussing constitutional status of-privacy).
In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Court defined a "general right to privacy," (as
opposed to the specific privacy guarantees under the Fourth Amendment), as "the right to be let alone
by other people." Id. at 350; cf Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
193, 195 (1890) (discussing right to privacy as the "right to be let alone"). The Court has not further
developed a definition of privacy in the Fourth Amendment context, however, because since Katz its
analysis has focused on reasonable expectations instead of on privacy itself.
80. Cf Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1056
(1978) ("before courts apply any of the standards developed to effectuate the first amendment, they
must" develop some definition of religion and religious belief). Some commentators have suggested
that privacy may be undefinable. See, e.g., Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV.
233, 234 (1977); Kurland, The Private I, U. CHI. MAG., Autumn, 1976, at 7, 12. A workable definition must be attempted, however, as these same commentators have gone on to do, unless privacy
analysis under the Fourth Amendment is to be abandoned.
81. The danger of allowing individual courts to decide what constitutes a reasonable expectation
of privacy without giving them objective guidelines is that "[als the judges' own values vary, so does
the scope of the Fourth Amendment." Note, supra note 21, at 1474.
82. Furthermore, law enforcement officers cannot be expected to understand and consistently apply Fourth Amendment privacy analysis without some objective guidelines. Cf. Parker, A Definition
of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 275, 276-77 (1974) (any definition of privacy should be judged
under three criteria: accurate data-fit, simplicity, and "applicability by lawyers and courts").
83. See, e.g., I. ALTMAN, supra note 5, at 20 ("selective control of access to the self or to one's
group"); A. WESTIN, supra note 5, at 7 (individuals' ability "to determine for themselves when, how,
and to what extent information about them is communicated to others," and to control their "voluntary and temporary withdrawal" from society); Gavison, supra note 5, at 428 ("secrecy, anonimity,
and solitude"); Laufer & Wolfe, supra note 43, at 23 ("management of interaction . . . and information"); Marshal, Privacy and Environment, 1 HUMAN ECOLOGY 93, 93 (1972) ("ability to control the
degree to which people and institutions impinge upon one's life"); Scanlon, Thomson on Privacy, 4
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 315, 326 (1975) ("our ability to control who has access to us and to information
about us"); Note, supra note 57, at 841 (automobile searches involve intrusions upon "privacy as
secrecy"). But ef Shils, supra note 43, at 283 n.1 (secrecy can be distinguished from privacy on
ground that concept of privacy allows for voluntary disclosure of information while secrecy does not).
All legal defintions of privacy, including that suggested here, owe some debt to Warren & Brandeis'
seminal discussion of privacy in the libel context as the "right to be let alone." See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 79, at 193.
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ment's right to intrude upon secrecy and solitude respectively."4 Such a
conjunction of the legal and social science concepts of privacy is desirable,
and "secrecy and solitude" may therefore be adopted as the starting point
for a broad yet more objective constitutional definition of privacy.S With
this embryonic definition in mind, courts should view any governmental
violation of an individual's control over personal information or interaction with others as an infringement of Fourth Amendment privacy
interests.86
B.

HierarchicalPrivacy: Undesirable and Unworkable

Once privacy interests are identified, Fourth Amendment analysis must
provide a rubric for applying the protections of the Amendment to those
interests in particular circumstances. The hierarchical approach of the
lesser expectations of privacy rationale, despite its apparent sophistication, 7 creates a system of Fourth Amendment analysis that is unworkable
and discriminatory. Moreover, an exception to the warrant requirement
based solely upon warrant costs ignores the constitutional balance struck
in the Fourth Amendment, and is therefore unacceptable.
84. With regard to secrecy, see, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979) (protecting secrecy
of contents of closed suitcase); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (protecting secrecy of
telephone calls made from public phone booth); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878) (protecting "secrecy of letters and . . . sealed packages"). With regard to solitude (i.e., interaction with government agents), see, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979) (police stop of automobile is
Fourth Amendment "seizure" even though "quite brief"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968)
("whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has
'seized' that person" for Fourth Amendment purposes).
85. Defining privacy as secrecy and solitude helps to objectify the concept because the two component interests, personal information and interaction with others, have relatively concrete meanings and
are therefore capable of objective definition. Hence these interests will be more immediately and consistently identifiable by large numbers of individuals, including judges, law enforcement officers, and
the average citizen. An element of subjectivity undeniably remains in this definition; this is, however,
the inherent difficulty in any definitional process, especially one concerning constitutional concepts,
and it should not forestall the attempt. See Gerety, supra note 80, at 236 & nn.14-16 (definition of
privacy must rest on subjective intuitions at some level, but, as with all intuitions, "if enough people
share them . . . we say we know them to be so"); cf. Note, supra note 80, at 1072 (search for
constitutional definition of religion is "inherently problematic" due to unavoidable recourse to "inductive reasoning").
86. Infringement of a privacy interest merely triggers further Fourth Amendment analysis, see pp.
337-38, and does not necessarily lead to full Fourth Amendment protections. See pp. 320-21 supra
(discussing exceptions to full Fourth Amendment protection); cf p. 315 supra (Fourth Amendment
analysis is two-step process).
87. See pp. 322-26 supra (discussing lesser expectation of privacy approach to Fourth Amendment analysis). To the extent that the lesser expectations approach identifies obvious rough distinctions among privacy interests, see p. 332 infra, and permits intermediate levels of Fourth Amendment
protection, it may appear more sophisticated than the simple dichotomy between reasonable and unreasonable expectations of privacy. Because results under this approach are unfair, unworkable, and
constitutionally impermissible, however, see pp. 331-36 infra, its apparent sophistication is only skindeep.

Privacy
1. A New Implicit Balance
Because the exception to the warrant requirement for "lesser" privacy
interests is only now emerging, its theoretical foundation can only be
surmised. Given that the Supreme Court has failed to assert any compelling societal need as a counterbalance to the privacy interests that are infringed under this approach, 8 it appears that the underlying analysis
weighs the bare cost of the warrant process itself against privacy.89 Apparently, privacy interests judged to be less "valuable" than the cost of a
warrant are excepted from the warrant requirement. If warrant costs are
in fact being viewed as the implicit counterbalance to "lesser" privacy interests, the analysis represents a significant break with past Fourth
Amendment doctrine. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the
cost of the warrant process should not affect the Fourth Amendment balance; warrants are "not an inconvenience to be somehow 'weighed' against
• . .police efficiency." 90
2. A Privacy Hierarchy-NeitherWorkable Nor Fair
There are several reasons to believe that a privacy hierarchy that discriminates between privacy interests of "lesser" and "greater" importance
or value will be unfair and unworkable in practice. First, privacy is a
culturally diverse concept, 9 ' and it is unlikely that a single fair hierarchy
of privacy concerns can be developed. Individuals placed in different environments develop varying conceptions of privacy that are compatible with
88. See p. 325 supra (Supreme Court has not identified any counterbalancing need to justify a
lesser expectation of privacy exception to warrant requirement). It must not be forgotten that privacy
interests are actually identified and held affected in cases that employ the "lesser interest" approach.
See p. 326 supra (Supreme Court continues to hold that privacy interests in automobiles are
significant).
89. Cf United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1170 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 102 S.
Ct. 386 (1981) (speculating that "the argument [for lesser expectation of privacy exception] appears to
be that" some privacy claims "are too small, [or] too insecure . . . to burden the time of a
magistrate").
90. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971); see note 115 infra (citing cases in
accord).
91. Professor Altman has argued that the desire and capability to achieve and regulate privacy is
a "cultural universal," common to human beings in all settings. Altman, Privacy Regulation: Culturally Universal or Culturally Specific? 33 J. SOC. ISSUES 66, 68, 82 (1977). Accord, A. WESTIN, supra
note 4, at 13 ("Needs for individual and group privacy and resulting social norms are present in
virtually every society.") Although the universality of the human need and desire for privacy is undeniable, specific conceptions of what constitutes a desirable level of privacy and how to achieve it vary
both among and within cultures, creating "cultural diversity" for purposes of comparing specific privacy interests. See Altman, supra,at 67-68, 69 ("a person may use different [privacy regulating mechanisms], depending upon circumstances" and "specific behaviors and techniques used to [regulate privacy] may be quite different from culture to culture"); id. at 72-82 (giving examples of different
cultural privacy conceptions from areas such as Brazil, Africa, and South Pacific); A. WESTIN, supra
note 4, at 11-18, 26-30 (giving cross-cultural examples); see generally E. HALL, THE HIDDEN DiMENSION 123-67 (1966) (discussing different cross-cultural and intra-cultural conceptions of privacy).
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prevailing conditions.2 If the manifestations of such diverse privacy conceptions effectively preserve privacy, however, they cannot be said to be
objectively wrong, unreasonable, or "less valuable" to their holders."
Any attempt to rank claims to privacy in order of their relative importance will therefore vary according to the ranker's conception of privacy,
and no unitary scale can be developed without slighting others that may
be equally valid.94 While rough distinctions among privacy interests may
possibly be made on a general level (for example, that automobiles are
generally held to be less private places than houses), the importance of
privacy to different individuals in particular circumstances cannot readily
be generalized nor predicted.95 If the privacy hierarchy preferred by the
majority is chosen as the constitutional standard for Fourth Amendment
analysis, identifiable privacy interests of nonconforming minorities will in92. See I. ALTMAN, supra note 4, at 32 ("[Privacy mechanisms can change over time and are
responsive to the situation at hand."); Laufer & Wolfe, supra note 43, at 25 (same); Marshall, supra
note 83, at 95 (same). Privacy conceptions will be varied rather than absent in conditions that are
adverse to secrecy and solitude because privacy is a fundamental human need. See note 4 supra (discussing importance of privacy). Examples of privacy conceptions that differ from those of the majority
of Americans are those held by the poor, see, e.g., I. ALTMAN, supra note 4, at 38 (indigent couple
achieved privacy from seven children by placing marital bed behind "wall built out of empty crates");
G. SUTTLES, THE SOCIAL ORDER OF THE SLUM 78, 91 (1968) (poor have a "homelife that allows for
little privacy" yet have street life of a "highly personal and private nature"), and by the mentally ill,
see, e.g., E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS 230-37, 246, 251-52 (1961) (residents of mental hospital sought
privacy in "underground trench," "partly wooded field," "dark alcove," and beneath blankets on
floor, and concealed their personal possessions in jacket pockets, shopping bags, socks, and a "cleanedout tobacco pouch"); Bettelheim, Feral Children and Autistic Children, 64 AM. J. SOC. 455, 458
(1959) (autistic children "build themselves dens in dark corners or closets" by using blankets).
93. Whether privacy is "effectively preserved" in a particular situation will require an objective
examination of the circumstances for secrecy or solitude. See pp. 329-30 supra. Although a particular
privacy claim or mechanism may seem bizarre to other individuals, it is objectively valid if it has
preserved some degree of secrecy or solitude even in a tenuous manner. Cf I. ALTMAN, supra note 4,
at 38 (example of bedroom wall made of orange crates).
94. Cf. K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 59 (2d ed. 1963) ("[Mlethods of
passing from individual tastes to social preferences . . . are either imposed or dictatorial.");
Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of
Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 157 n.48 (1978) (noting "logical impossiblity of
there being some such procedure or formula for combining individual preference orderings so as to get
determinate and consistent social preference orderings").
95. Thus in a particular situation an individual may value the privacy of his automobile more
than that available in his home, and entire classes of people, such as residents of crowded tenements,
may value their automobiles far more than their apartments as private places. See Yackle, supra note
37, at 410-411 (1978) (suggesting examples of persons who place high value on the privacy of their
motor vehicles: "family that lives in a mobile home or. . . a recreational vehicle," "traveling salesperson," and persons "who live in over-crowded apartments where the television set is always blasting,
the phone is always ringing, and the kids are always screaming"). Even if the lesser interests approach permitted individuals with differing privacy hierarchies to demonstrate that their specific privacy interests are "important enough" to receive full Fourth Amendment protection, it would constitute an unexplained shifting of the burden of proof from the government on whom that burden
traditionally lies. See note 67 supra (noting implicit burden shift under lesser interests approach). The
cost of individualized hearings to determine the status of privacy claims also argues against such an
approach.
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evitably be impinged upon as "lesser," 96 an unfair and undesirable result
in a constitutional system that generally respects minority rights. 97

In addition, income level variations among members of society make it
likely that an analysis that slights lesser privacy interests will adversely
affect the poor. 9 Some commentators have suggested that the precautions
taken to preserve privacy should be looked to when evaluating which privacy interests are reasonable or important enough to merit full Fourth
Amendment protection.9 The poor, however, are less able to afford precautions that might serve as such indicators,"'0 and therefore would be
more likely to be subjected to intrusions than would wealthy individuals.
Consequently, as Judge Bazelon has noted with regard to container
searches, the lesser interests approach "makes the level of constitutional
protection available to a citizen dependent on his ability to purchase a
fancy repository for his belongings."' 01 A constitutional analysis that sys96. Cf. United States v. Moschetta, 646 F.2d 955, 961 n.9 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[S]ome people in our
society do use paper sacks. . . for receptacles of personal effects, even if the majority do not. Any new
expectation of privacy analysis which in effect [fails to protect such containers] necessarily implies the
denigration of the privacy interests of such people."); Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 404 (people who
live in private homes "tend to take a rather parochial view of privacy" and "denigrate the importance
of degrees of privacy" to "ghetto flat" residents).
97. Thus, as in the parallel area of religious freedom under the First Amendment, conceptions of
privacy are radically pluralistic, and "[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it
is that no official . . . can prescribe what shall be orthodox." West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 642 (1943). Cf Note, supra note 80, at 1072 (danger of subjective definition of religion is
"that courts will determine what is or is not religion on the basis of their own parochial experience,"
resulting in "arbitrary exclusion of the unorthodox").
98. This second criticism should be differentiated from the 'criticism that a hierarchical privacy
system will discriminate against nonconforming minorities. Not all nonconforming minorities are
poor, and the approach discriminates in this second way because the particular minority is poor, not
merely because it fails to conform.
99. See Rakas v. Illinois 439 U.S. 128, 152 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (court should examine
whether ;ndividual "took normal precautions to maintain his privacy"); Note, supra note 42, at 148084 (courts should examine whether means used to secure privacy are "reasonably calculated to acheive
that purpose"). Although a "reasonable precautions" focus may sharpen the reasonable expectation of
privacy test somewhat, see id. at 1480-81, it obviously does not avoid the subjectivity inherent in any
"reasonableness" approach, and may result in a failure to protect privacy in situations where precautions are unavailable to an individual or are seemingly unnecessary. See Note, supra note 21, at 169
(precautions focus offers "no refinement of 'reasonableness' concept," and fails in circumstances where
"taking precautions ... is either unduly burdensome . . . or wholly inconsistent with basic notions
of individual autonomy"); Note, Katz and the Fourth Amendment: A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy or, A Man's Home is His Fort, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 63, 66-72 (1974) (taken to logical extreme, precautions focus could result in Fourth Amendment protection only for hermit-like occupants
of windowless, soundproof forts).
100. See Katz, Patterns of Arrest and the Dangers of Public Visibility, 9 CRIM. L. BULL. 311,
320 (1973) (wealthy persons can better afford "private facilities" equipped with "locks, doors, curtains, gates, [and] fences" than can the poor); Shulman, Bag Ladies, The New York Times, Sept. 29,
1981, at A27, col. 1 ("[W]hile most of us have drawers [and] closets . . . in which to store our
possessions, the homeless . . . have only their shopping bags.")
101. United States v. Ross, No. 79-1624, slip op. at 10 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 17, 1980) (Bazelon, J.,
dissenting), rev'd en banc 655 F.2d. 1159, cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 386 (1981). As the en banc
majority in Ross noted, an exception to the warrant requirement for containers alleged to have lesser
privacy interests "would snare those without the means or the sophistication to use worthy containers." 655 F.2d at 1170.
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tematically tends to deprive the poor of a fundamental right such as privacy is not only undesirable, but also constitutionally impermissible." 2
Finally, the infinite variety of circumstances possible in search and
seizure cases, combined with the inherent subjectivity of a hierarchical
privacy analysis as outlined above, makes a lesser interests approach to
Fourth Amendment analysis unworkable. Every case presents a unique
set of facts that may be relevant to the determination of the status of a
privacy claim, and courts have failed to develop discernible standards by
which consistent determinations can be made."0 3 Consequently, in reviewing various container searches, some courts have found that a knapsack,
zippered and unzipped carrying bags, a cardboard box, and a closed paper
bag all manifest privacy interests that are insufficient to merit warrant
protection." 4 Other courts have come to the opposite conclusion in cases
involving virtually identical containers."0 5 While case-by-case adjudication
might eventually produce relatively consistent guidelines in some areas of
law, this has never been the case in the Fourth Amendment context.' 6
102. Poor persons do not necessarily constitute a "suspect class" for purposes of constitutional
analysis. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) ("[Ploverty, standing alone, is not a suspect
classification.") However, "if a law impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly secured
by the Consitution, [it] is presumptively unconstitutional." Id. at 312 (quoting Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U.S. 55, 76 (1980) (plurality opinion)) (brackets in original). Because privacy is a fundamental constitutional right, see note 5 supra, a practice that discriminates against the privacy interests of the poor
cannot be sustained without compelling justification.
103. The clearest guidance as to how to identify reasonable expectations of privacy ever offered by
a majority of the Supreme Court appeared in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 n.12 (1978)
(courts should refer "to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society"). Concurring in Rakas, Justice Powell noted that the majority's suggestion would "not provide law enforcement officials with a bright line" and would lack "ready administration." Id. at 152. Justice Powell then admirably attempted to provide some guiding principles
for application of the reasonable expectation of privacy theory. He identified four general categories
that courts should examine when appliying the analysis: (1) the precautions taken to maintain privacy; (2) the manner in which a location or object is used; (3) whether the type of governmental
intrusion at issue was thought objectionable at the time the Fourth Amendment was enacted; and (4)
any applicable property or possessory interests. Id. at 152-53. Unfortunately, Justice Powell did not
specify how these factors were to be weighed in the privacy analysis; although he recognized that his
categories would not provide much more specific guidance, he argued that "facile solutions" were
unavailable. Id. at 156. No subsequent Supreme Court decision has adopted Justice Powell's suggestions, and they remain the Court's only true attempt at clarification of current Fourth Amendment
privacy analysis.
104. See, e.g., United States v. Ocampo, 650 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1981) (unzipped flight bags);
United States v. Markland, 635 F.2d 174 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 991 (1981) (zippered
plastic beverage bag); United States v. Mackey, 626 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1980) (paper bag) United
States v. Neumann, 585 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1978) ("unsecured cardboard box"); State v. Schrier, 283
N.W.2d 338 (Iowa 1979) (knapsack).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Cleary, 656 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1981), petition for cert. iled, 50
U.S.L.W. 3502 (Dec. 22, 1981) (unzipped canvas bag); United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C.
Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3265 (Oct. 13, 1981) (paper bag); United States v.
Rigales, 630 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1980) (zippered leather case); United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d 1038
(2d cir. 1979), affld on rehearing, 615 F.2d 10 (1980) (taped cardboard boxes); United States v.
Bloomfield, 594 F.2d 1200 (8th Cir. 1979) (knapsack).
106. See Dworkin, supra note 71, at 334 (current analysis, "which assumes that fourth amendment law can develop meaningfully on a case by case basis, . . . is an abysmal failure"); LaFave,

Privacy
Such judicial confusion creates even greater difficulties for law enforcement officials, whose conduct is theoretically guided by judicial interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.' 7 When confronted with a multitude of
potential privacy claims, the officer on the street using the lesser interests
approach has little to rely upon besides his own estimation of their importance, which may well differ from that of the suspect, another officer, or
later, a judge. "' Errors will inevitably be made, and a system of law enforcement based on such indefinite and shifting ground is undesirable for
citizens as well as unworkable for the police.'0 9
C.

Warrant Costs and the Constitutional Bargain

Even if a fair and workable hierarchy of privacy interests were possible,
Fourth Amendment protections for lesser interests should not be reduced
to save the cost of a warrant. The public interest in efficient law enforcement is emminently valid. But putting aside the possibility that foregoing
the warrant requirement may not be truly cost-effective, "0 the claim of
police efficiency must be analyzed in light of our constitutional history.
"Case-By-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures" The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP.
CT. REV. 127, 141-43 (criticizing case-by-case decisionmaking in Fourth Amendment context).
107. See New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2863 (1981) (Fourth Amendment doctrine should
guide police conduct in "day-to-day activities") (quoting LaFave, supra note 106, at 141); Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 369 (same); Dworkin, supra note 106, at 365 (same).
108. Cf Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841, 2846 (1981) (plurality opinion) (as "disparate
[case] results. . . indicate, no court, no constable, no citizen, can sensibly be asked to distinguish the
relative 'privacy interests' in" various containers). Law enforcement officers freely admit the confusion
that they feel under current Fourth Amendment analysis. See Conboy, Letter to the Editor, N.Y.
TIMES, October 6, 1981, at A30, col. 3 (letter from New York City Deputy Police Commissioner)
(current Fourth Amendment rules "cannot be understood" by police due to their "obscurity"); cf
Robbins v. California, 101 S.Ct. 2841, 2851 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (" '[L]aw enforcement
officers and prosecutorial authorities must find quite intolerable the present state of [Fourth Amendment] uncertainty.' ") (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 490 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
109. Besides providing no guidance for police, uncertain Fourth Amendment rules lead to increased suppression litigation and consequent exclusion of evidence. Lack of clarity also leaves citizens
uncertain and uneasy regarding the extent of their protection under the Constitution. See New York
v. Belton, 101 S.Ct., 2860, 2864 (1981) (if rules are unclear "person cannot know the scope of his
constitutional protection, nor can a policeman know the scope of his authority"); Dworkin, supra note
71, at 365 (if rules are unpredictable, "police are encouraged to perform questionable searches and
seizures" which, in turn, "results in unnecessary invasions of individual rights and in litigation which
could well have been avoided"); LaFave, supra note 106, at 142 (result of uncertain rules "may be the
sustaining of motions to suppress" as well as uncertain security for privacy rights).
110. Cost effectiveness of the warrant process has never been empirically examined by courts or
commentators, yet it is not an insubstantial issue. Searches conducted pursuant to a validly obtained
warrant are more likely to be favorably viewed by courts, see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 417,
419 (1969) (magistrate's "determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts"); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106 (1965) (noting "preference to be accorded
searches under a warrant"), and by juries, see Note, supra note 32, at 692 (warranted searches are
"presumptively lawful" and create "favorable impression on bbth court and jury"). Therefore, probative evidence seized under warrant is less likely to be excluded by courts. In addition, resources of the
criminal justice system viewed as a whole may well be conserved by an increase in warrant usage,
because suppression litigation will become less time-consuming and may even be foregone in cases
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The Fourth Amendment represents a compromise between the interest
in unfettered law enforcement and the interest in the privacy and security
of one's "effects." 1" The Amendment with its warrant requirement reflects the considered views of our constitutional forefathers as to how the
balance should be struck.'12 Weighing anew the cost of a warrant against
its benefits each time a privacy interest is at stake reopens a decision that
has already been made as part of the constitutional bargain,"1 3 and thereby
constitutes a "double-counting" of the law enforcement factor. So long as
the warrant requirement stands as a central component of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, its protections must be deemed worth their cost, and
the requirement should "operat[e] as a matter of course."" 4 Because warrant costs thus assume a "zero weight" in modern Fourth Amendment
analysis,"' even "lesser" privacy interests should tip the scales in favor of
full Fourth Amendment protection." 6
where a search cannot be challenged as warrantless. See Israel, supra note 32, at 252 & n.127 (noting
"legal and practical advantages that attach to the use of warrants"). Supreme Court Justices have
disagreed about the magnitude of the burdens imposed by the warrant process without supportive
citation. Compare Steagald v. United States, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 1652 (1981) (inconvenience for police is
"simply not that significant") with id. at 1655 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (burden on police "is
great"). It would be senseless to accept a new Fourth Amendment analysis that entailed a loss of
warrant protection without becoming more certain of the costs involved.
111.
See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979) ("long prevailing standards" of
Fourth Amendment represent "best compromise that has been found for accommodating the often
opposing interests in safeguarding citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and
in seeking to give fair leeway for enforcing the law") (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, 176 (1949)) (quotation marks and brackets omitted).
112. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment reflects the
view of those who wrote the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a person's home and property may not
be totally sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity in enforcement of the crimial law."); cf.
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 222 (1981) ("Any warrant requirement impedes to some
extent the vigor [of law enforcement], yet the Fourth Amendment recognizes that this restraint is
necessary is some cases to protect against unreasonable searches and seizures."); Yackle, supra note
37, at 386 ("[F]ramers could hardly have intended to closely circumscribe warranted police action, but
to leave warrantless action largely unimpeded.")
113. Cf Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-214 (1979) (Fourth Amendment's protections
may not be reduced by "balancing of the miltifarious circumstances presented by different cases"
because "the requisite 'balancing' has been performed in centuries of precedent"); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971) ("warrant requirement has been a valued part of our constitutional law for decades" and is not to be reconsidered in each case).
114. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971).
115. Cf Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) ("[TIhe meri fact that law enforcement
may be made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment. The
investigation of crime would always be simplified if warrants were unnecessary.") (citation omitted);
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 322 (1978) (rejecting argument that "administrative burdens" caused by warrant process outweigh "incremental protections afforded . . . privacy" by that
process); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971) (warrant requirement "is not an
inconvenience to be somehow 'weighed' against the claims of police efficiency"); Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948) ("[Ilnconvenience to the officers and some slight delay necessary to
prepare papers and present the evidence to a magistrate . . . certainly are not enough to by-pass the
constitutional [warrant] requirement.")
116. Thus the spirit of William Pitt's eloquent claim for protection of the least secure residence
can be realized in the privacy context. See Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (quoting Pitt
from 1763) ("The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may
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III.

A New Framework for Analysis

Three goals of Fourth Amendment privacy analysis emerge from the
discussion above: accomodation of a broad diversity of privacy claims, and
nondiscriminatory and workable analytical results. In light of the failure
of current Fourth Amendment analysis to achieve these goals, a new analytical framework is necessary. Using a definition of privacy such as secrecy and solitude, courts should err on the side of Fourth Amendment
protection,"' and should develop inclusive "bright-line" standards to consistently guide law enforcers. Application of this new approach demonstrates that a "closed, opaque container" rule for warrant application in
container search cases is appropriate, and that certain case results should
be reappraised.
A.

Fourth Amendment Analysis

The promise of Katz-expansive protection of privacy under the
Fourth Amendment-has not been fulfilled under current privacy analysis. ' As a fundamental right, privacy requires strict and broad protection.
Because the importance of privacy interests cannot be fairly or accurately ranked on a relative scale, the scope of the Fourth Amendment
should encompass even those interests that seem insubstantial to many
members of society." 9 A showing of some compelling societal need may
justify reduction in Fourth Amendment protection for such interests on
some occasions,120 but the cost of administering the warrant process, without more, should never be held to counterbalance a recognized privacy
be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it;. . . but the King of England cannot enter
. . .the ruined tenement!")
117. Cf. Gavison, supra note 5, at 467-71 (law should make "explicit commitment to privacy" as
a "central value").
118. The Supreme Court has applied the reasonable expectation of privacy test to deny Fourth
Amendment protection to claims that clearly appear to invoke some cognizable privacy interest. See,
e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (upholding warrantless use of pen registers to
record local numbers dialed on telephone); South Dakota v. Oppermann, 428 U.S. 364, 367-69 (1976)
(upholding warrantless police inventory search of closed automobile glove compartment); United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (upholding warrantless seizure and examination of bank
records created under Bank Secrecy Act of 1970). Cf. Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 385 (reasonable
expectation of privacy analysis "fails to capture" spirit of Katz); Yackle, supra note 37, at 362 ("Burger Court has used the Katz approach . . . to restrict rather than to expand the scope of constitutional
protection."); see also notes 21 & 71 supra (citing critics of reasonable expectation of privacy
analysis).
119. See pp. 331-33 supra (criticizing hierarchical approach to privacy); cf Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1971) (freedom of expression must be broadly construed, to effect "constitutional
policies" of "individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests"); L. TRIBE, AMIERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1, at 579 (1978) (any theory of freedom of speech should "protect a
rich variety of expressional modes").
120. See pp. 317, 321-22 (exceptions to Fourth Amendment requirements granted upon showing
of "compelling societal need").
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interest." 1 Moreover, once a privacy interest has been implicated, the burden of persuasion to justify intrusions should remain on parties opposed to
full Fourth Amendment protection,"' and exceptions, if granted, should
be narrowly circumscribed in order to provide maximum protection for
the interests at stake. In short, all privacy interests should be analyzed
equally under the Fourth Amendment, to prevent subtle or unwitting discrimination against minority-held privacy interests.
Under the suggested approach, Fourth Amendment analysis would still
proceed in two steps. First, determination of the scope of constitutional
protection would focus on identification of secrecy or solitude. Second,
protective application would focus on the presence of exigency or other
compelling societal interest that might justify reducing Fourth Amendment protections. Any identified privacy interests would be accorded the
full protection of the Amendment, including the warrant requirement, unless some counterbalancing justification other than the expense of the warrant itself were demonstrated.
Courts should develop and apply the proposed analysis in a manner
that provides comprehensible guidance to police. 2 ' Because privacy is not
concrete as is property, and is therefore more difficult to identify in the
field, courts should use the suggested analysis to develop "bright-line"
standards that can be easily applied by law enforcers. 124 This is not to
suggest, however, that any bright line is acceptable. On the contrary, such
standards should be consistent with the broad, nondiscriminatory foundation of the proposed analytical framework, and therefore be drawn at the
outer bounds of any particular area of application. 2 1 Such standards will
121. See pp. 335-36 supra (warrant costs already included in "constitutional bargain" of the
Fourth Amendment); cf Stanley Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972) ("Constitution recognizes higher
values than speed and efficiency" and Bill of Rights was designed to protect rights from "overbearing
concern for efficiency"); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) ("objective of reducing the workload on
probate courts . . . is not without some legitimacy," but it does not justify sex discrimination under
equal protection clause).
122. See p. 325 & note 67 supra (criticizing implicit burden of proof shift emerging in Fourth
Amendment analysis).
123. See note 107 supra (one goal of Fourth Amendment analysis is to guide conduct of law
enforcement officers).
124. See New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2863 (1981) (praising Fourth Amendment rules
that are "straightforward, . . . easily applied, and predictably enforced," because they enable police to
"'reach a correct determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the
interest of law enforcement' ") (quoting LaFave, supra note 106, at 142); Dunaway v. New York, 442
U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979) ("single, familiar standard is essential" for police officers, "who have only
limited time and expertise").
125. See, e.g., United States v. Cleary, 656 F.2d 1302, 1304-05 (9th Cir. 1981), petition for cert.
filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3502 (Dec. 22, 1981) (drawing inclusive bright-line rule for container searches,
based on "desirability of drawing clear lines in fourth amendment adjudication" and "dramatic funprotective] consequences of an alternative approach"); United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1170
(D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 386 (1981) (same).
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protect privacy and yet provide police with a Fourth Amendment analysis
that is workable on a day-to-day basis.
B.

Container Searches

Because the expectation of privacy and lesser interests approaches inevitably cause confusion, police searches of containers are currently a source
of much Fourth Amendment conflict." 6 Container searches therefore provide a useful backdrop for application of the privacy analysis proposed
above. A "container" is anything that can enclose another object; it might
be an automobile trunk, a suitcase, or a paper bag.' Police typically seize
such containers in the course of an arrest, upon suspicion that they contain contraband or criminal evidence. 2 Because such containers, once
lawfully seized, are in the "exclusive control" of the police, delaying a
search of the containers to seek a warrant presents no risk of loss or destruction of the contents. 2 9 How should the non-exigent search of such
containers be dealt with under the Fourth Amendment?
A container that successfully prevents outside identification of its contents preserves privacy in the sense of secrecy, and therefore should fall
126. See p. 334 supra (listing conflicting results in container-search cases). Judge Tamm has
compiled an exhaustive list of container-search decisions. See United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159,
1174-75 nn.3 & 4 (D.C. Cir.) (Tamm, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 386 (1981).
127. Cf. New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2864 n.4 (1981) (" 'Container' here denotes any
object capable of holding another object.")
128. See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841, 2844 (1981) (packages seized and searched
after defendant was arrested and placed in patrol car); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 755 (1979)
(suitcase seized and searched after arrest of taxicab passenger); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S.
1, 4 (1977) (footlocker seized and searched 90 minutes after arrest of owners). In virtually all such
cases, if officers have probable cause to believe that the container contains contraband, they also have
probable cause to arrest its possessor. See 2 RINGEL, SEARCHES & SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 23.3(a), at 23-9 through 23-15 (2d ed. 1980) (probable cause for arrest in contraband cases is
established not only by sight of contraband, but also by smell, sight of common contraband containers,
suspicious behavior, informants' tips, and other "special rules"). Thus it is difficult to imagine a
situation in which the person holding a container that may be validly seized and searched could not
also be detained validly until a warrant for the container search was obtained. But see United States
v. Ross, 655 F.2d. 1159, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Wilkey, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 386
(1981) (when automobile is stopped on probable cause that it contains contraband, it is "normally the
case" that owners cannot be detained).
Judge Wilkey has argued that because such situations might arise, a warrant should not be required, because if the warrant is refused for lack of probable cause, the arresting officer might be open
to a "constitutional tort action" for unlawfully detaining the container's owner. Id. at 1199. Putting
aside the issue of whether such a distant possibility, see note 40 supra (damages actions against police
unlikely to succeed), should justify a sacrifice of Fourth Amendment privacy protection, Judge
Wilkey's criticism proves too much. For if an officer were not required to obtain a warrant in such
circumstances and instead searched the container on the spot, he would still be open to a hypothetical
"constitutional tort action" on grounds of "unlawful search," if he had no probable cause for his
action. Foregoing the warrant requirement for containers, then, will still fail to protect officers from
the litigious, innocent victims of their excesses.
129. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977); accord Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S.
753, 762 (1979).
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within the scope of the Fourth Amendment"' and generally be protected
by the warrant requirement. On the other hand, open or transparent containers that reveal their contents to plain view, or permeable containers
that permit positive identification of their contents by releasing distinctive
odors or other perceptual cues unmistakable to the human senses, do not
embody privacy interests, and police should be allowed to examine them
upon probable cause alone."'
Containers that are flimsy or not commonly thought of as carriers for
personal effects should also receive full protection under the Fourth
Amendment if they preserve secrecy." 2 The distinction between tenuous
130. Despite the lack of a clear privacy definition or analysis, most courts have held that closed,
opaque containers fall with the scope of the Fourth Amendment, and have required at least probable
cause for their search. Cf p. 326 supra (Supreme Court requires probable cause for warrantless
automobile searches).
131. See Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841, 2846 (1981) (plurality opinion) (Fourth Amendment does not protect containers that are "transparent" or "open to 'plain view' "); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764-65 n.13 (same). The Supreme Court has never approved a "plain sense"
equivalent to the "plain view" exception, cf Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948) ("odors
alone do not authorize a search without warrant"), but lower courts have approved such a concept if
the sensation is unmistakable and obvious to the "unaided" senses. See, e.g., United States v. Russell,
655 F.2d 1261, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd on reh'g on othergrounds, No. 1139 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 22,
1982) (when officer felt gun in lawfully seized paper bag, "lulncovering what his sense of touch
revealed did not require a warrant"); United States v. Ocampo, 650 F.2d 421, 429 (9th Cir. 1981)
(endorsing " 'plain feel' version of the 'plain view' doctrine"); United States v. Solis, 536 F.2d 880,
881 (9th Cir. 1976) ("[Evidence acquired by unaided senses . . . is usable under doctrines of plain
view .... "); United States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d. 459, 461 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
918 (1976) (if police officers detected odors "through their own olfactory senses, there could be no
serious contention that their sniffing . . . would be tantamount to an unlawful search").
Unaided perception of the identity of a container's contents, if as certain as visual ascertainment,
would preclude any claim to secrecy. Thus such "plain sense" exceptions would be valid within the
analytical framework proposed here.
132. Cf Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841, 2846 (1981) (plurality opinion) (any "closed,
opaque container" is protected by the warrant requirement); accord, United States v. Weber, 664
F.2d 841 (1st Cir. 1981) (refusing exception to warrant requirement for rolled-up rainslicker, and
adopting Robbins' "closed, opaque container" rule); United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1170-71
(D.C. Cir.) (en bane), ceri. granted, 102 S. Ct 386 (1981) (refusing exception to warrant requirement
for "unworthy" containers); United States v. Moschetto, 646 F.2d 955, 961 (5th Cir. 1981) (refusing
"to create a blanket exception to the Fourth Amendment for paper bags ... based upon durability of
common usage"; cf United States v. Cleary, 656 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1981), petition for cert. filed, 50
U.S.L.W. 3502 (Dec. 22, 1981) (refusing exception to warrant requirement for unzipped canvas bag).
In his unreported panel decision in Ross, supra, Judge Tamm was apparently the first to explicitly
apply a hierarchical privacy analysis to containers, holding that the warrant requirement did not
apply to paper bags because they "can fall open or break very easily" and ire not "a normal place" to
store personal effects. Ross v. United States, No. 79-1624, slip op. at 14 (D.C. Cir. April 17, 1980),
rev'd en banc, 655 F.2d 1159, cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 386 (1981). Justice Powell has apparently
adopted a similar hierarchical approach to container search cases. See Robbins v. California, 101 S.
Ct. 2841, 2850 n.3 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring). Five Circuit Courts of Appeal have applied expectation of privacy analysis to hold that warrants are not required for the search of closed paper bags
because they are flimsy and unusual containers for personal effects. See United States v. Martino, 664
F.2d 860 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Mefford, 658 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1981); Virgin Islands v.
Rassool, 657 F.2d 582 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Brown, 635 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Mackey, 626 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1980); see also United States v. Goshorn, 628 F.2d 697 (1st
Cir. 1980) (questioned in Weber, supra); United States v. Jiminez, 626 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1980),
vacated and remanded, 101 S. Ct. 3152 (1981). Brown and Mackey were decided before Robbins, and
both opinions relied on the subsequently reversed panel decision in Ross.
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or unusual privacy interests and the absence of any privacy interest must
be clearly drawn: the latter receive no Fourth Amendment cognizance but
the former should be firmly and fully protected. Likewise, containers such
as gun or violin cases, that only suggest but do not reveal their contents,
should be held to implicate Fourth Amendment privacy interests. The
identity of the contents of such outwardly suggestive containers will remain uncertain unless further government action is taken, and this privacy
should be protected by the Fourth Amendment to the same extent as it is
in the case of other more nondescript containers."' The Supreme Court's
suggestion to the contrary appeared only as dictum in a footnote,"' and
should properly be rejected." 5 In sum, all containers that are closed and
opaque and otherwise preserve privacy should be fully subject to Fourth
Amendment privacy analysis.
A bright-line rule mandating full Forth Amendment protection for all
closed, opaque containers in non-exigent circumstances provides ease of
administration for police, as well as complete protection for privacy interests. First, there is no reason to believe that police department property
rooms will be overburdened by a multitude of containers, because officers
must now bring back the evidentiary contents of containers that they
search in the field. 36 Second, any resultant reduction in suppression litigation surrounding such searches will result in less time spent in such proceedings by officers, and less cost for the criminal justice system as a
whole. Third and most importantly, a distinct and understandable rule
will reduce officers' confusion on the job.137
133. Cf. Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841, 2846 (1981) (plurality opinion) (only container
that "clearly reveal[s] its contents" may be searched without warrant) (emphasis supplied). Contra,
People v. Green, 115 Cal. App. 3d 259, 261, 171 Cal. Rptr. 210, 212 (Ct. App. 1981) (gun case "by
its very nature cannot support a reasonable expectation of privacy"). Certainty regarding identity is of
paramount importance when the definition of privacy as secrecy is applied; gun and violin cases do
not necessarily contain the objects that they suggest. Cf. Sharpe v. United States, 660 F.2d 967, 980
(4th Cir. 1981) (Russell, J., dissenting) ("[S]omeone might . . . easily place socks, underwear, and a
toothbrush in a gun case.") If the hypothetical gun case were securely within the control of the police,
it would present no immediate danger to them and a warrant should be sought. If the situation were
otherwise, an exigent circumstances rationale, see p. 322 supra, would justify an immediate search.
134. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764-65 n.13 (1979) (suggesting that "some containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature" do not implicate Fourth
Amendment privacy interests "because their contents can be inferred from their outward
appearance").
135. See United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1170 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 102 S.
Ct. 386 (1981) (footnote 13 in Sanders, see note 134 supra, states no more than "plain view" exception to warrant requirement); United States v. Moschetta, 646 F.2d 955, 961 (5th Cir. 1981) (same).
136. Presumably, officers now seize and search only those containers for which they have probable
cause. Most warrantless container searches in the field should therefore yield criminal or evidentiary
items that must be taken back to the department and stored in any event. Under a strict warrant rule
it should be the case that only in a few instances will police bring back unopened containers that do
not contain criminal items; if such is not the case, then a strict warrant rule will act to discourage a
practice of unthinking general searches of containers.
137. See United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d. 1159, 1170 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 102 S.

The Yale Law Journal

Vol. 91: 313, 1981

Finally, the new privacy analysis suggests that the law governing
searches of automobiles should be thoroughly revised.' Once lawfully
seized, automobiles should be considered as no different from other large
containers."3 9 In contrast to the Supreme Court's unsupported assertions,
sociological evidence demonstrates that Americans associate strong privacy
concerns with their cars. t40 In non-exigent circumstances, the warrant requirement should be strictly applied to all the areas of an automobile that
preserve privacy, including the trunk, glove compartment, and hidden areas of the passenger compartment. 4 1 In addition, the "inventory exception" that permits warrantless searches of impounded automobiles should
be reexamined to the extent that it is based on the presumption that
automobiles generally embody "lesser" interests in privacy."" Protective,
Ct. 386 (1981) (rejecting exception to warrant requirement for "unworthy containers" because "most
importantly, it would destroy the coherence of a well-established, clear, eminently manageable rule");
United States v. Moschetta, 646 F.2d 955, 962 (5th Cir. 1981) ("to allow some but not all containers
to be protected . . . would be to cause worse confusion" for police).
The standard endorsed here may be overinclusive, protecting containers in some cases when their
owners actually have no interest in their privacy. To avoid the delay of seizure and warrant application, such owners are always free to consent to an immediate search. Cf Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42, 64 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (automobile owners who wish to avoid temporary seizure
of their cars may consent to search). The point of any expansive per se rule, however, is that the costs
of inclusivity are judged to be outweighed by the benefits of avoiding or reducing errors and the
savings of administrative costs required for case-by-case determinations. Cf United States v.
Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (in antitrust context, "[pier se
rules . . . are justified on the assumption that the gains from imposition . . . will far outweigh the

losses").
138. This suggestion is by.no means original. See notes 53 & 57 supra (listing critics of current
automobile search doctrine).
139. Cf Yackle, supra note 37, at 404 (automobiles are "highly mobile containers").
140. As Professor LaFave has noted, no less than luggage, the "trunk of a car is. . . intended as
a repository" of personal effects. W. LAFAVE, 2 SEARCHES AND SEIZURES § 7.2, at 540-41 (1978 and
Supp. 1980). Accord, Note, supra note 57, at 841 ("Using the car as a protected container, under lock
and key, is general in American society."); see Allen & Schaeffer, Great Expectations: Privacy Rights
in Automobiles, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 99, 142 (1979) (due to pervasive "role of the automobile in
today's society," Americans have "expanded expectations of privacy" when in their cars); Yackle,
supra note 37, at 411 (persons "often seek privacy on wheels"); Note, supra note 57, at 840 n.28, 841
("[flor modern America, the automobile has come to be seen as an expected place of privacy" and is
"often used for private activities").
141. Trial courts will have to make factual findings regarding searches beneath seats or in back
seats or hatch areas, with regard to whether or not items seized were secret, that is, not in plain view
or its equivalent.
142. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367-69 (1976) (upholding warrantless
searches of impounded motor vehicles according to regularized procedures based on caretaking functions of police, noncriminal context of inventories, and "diminished" expectations of privacy in
automobiles). The particular search at issue in Opperman was that of a closed glove compartment,
obviously one of the most private areas of an automobile. On remand, the South Dakota Supreme
Court held this search violative of the state constitution and ruled that inventory searches in general
must be limited to "articles which are in plain view." State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d. 673, 675
(S.D. 1976). Cf Wagner v. Commonwealth, 581 S.W.2d. 352, 357 (Ky. 1979) (automobile inventory
searches impermissible absent consent or "substantial necessities grounded upon public safety") (based
on state constitution). Despite Opperman's broad language, the Eighth Circuit has subsequently refused to uphold the warrantless inventory search of the trunk of an impounded automobile. See
United States v. Wilson, 636 F.2d 1161, 1164 (8th Cir. 1980) (noting "greater expectation of privacy
in the locked trunk" of a car, and distinguishing Opperman because that decision did not involve a
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bright-line standards can be developed for automobiles without wholly ex'
cluding them from Fourth Amendment protection. 43
Conclusion
Protection of privacy under the Fourth Amendment has been confused
and inconsistent. The law must develop a more objective and sociologically
accurate description of privacy if privacy interests are to be preserved to
the satisfaction of both citizens and police. Fourth Amendment analysis
should be revised to include a more objective definition of privacy as secrecy and solitude when determining the scope of the Amendment, and to
exclude warrant costs when applying its protections. Courts should use
this approach to develop inclusive, non-discriminatory guidelines for police, so that the Fourth Amendment can be applied effectively yet fairly in
the privacy context.
trunk search).
143. The Supreme Court evidently has taken a contrary view in its decision in New York v.
Belton, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981). Based on the need for a "workable rule" for automobile searches
incident to arrest, the Court held that the warrantless search of a vehicle and any containers within it
is permissible whenever the occupants have been lawfully arrested. Id. at 2864. This decision not only
eliminates warrant protection for cars and containers in them whenever a lawful arrest is made, but
also apparently relieves officers from having to demonstrate that they have probable cause to search at
all. Because this bright line is unprotective of the privacy interests in automobiles and removes them
completely from the Fourth Amendment's protective scope, it unavoidably conflicts with the analytical
framework that this Note proposes.

